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Rights of Nature in the European Union:
Contemplating the Operationalization
of an Eco-Centric Concept
in an Anthropocentric Environment?
Hendrik Schoukens
Abstract A global movement to give legal rights to nature is slowly gaining1
momentum in the face of the ongoing biodiversity crisis that is hitting our planet.2
At its core, the concept of rights of nature presupposes a novel template for ecolog-3
ical governance, which is aimed at prioritizing nature’s right to exist and to flourish4
through a societal and legal reform. This chapter makes two separate arguments.5
First, it argues that rights of nature constitutes a powerful new paradigm for ecolog-6
ical governance. Second, it demonstrates the difficulties and opportunities encoun-7
tered when operationalizing this emerging concept within the existing legal order8
through a case study on the interplay between nature’s rights and the existing EU9
legal order. In spite of the potential overlaps between the existing EU environmental10
laws and rights of nature, several long-standing defects of the existing EU legal order11
seem to block a further operationalization of rights of nature. Against the backdrop12
of the relatively strict case law at EU level with respect to standing in environmental13
cases before EU courts and the persisting anthropocentric nature of many EU envi-14
ronmental directives, this chapter concludes that only recognition of rights of nature15
within the national legal order of Member States is to be approached as a realistic16
pathway to the concrete operationalization of rights of nature within the EU legal17
order.18
Introduction19
The past decades have seen the adoption of a growing number of environmental20
treaties, laws and regulations aimed at halting ecological decline. While the scheme of21
the existing environmental regulations appears impressive at first sight, an increasing22
number of authors posit that these models of protecting nature and the environment23
are fundamentally flawed and therefore no longer apt to achieve their objectives24
(Wood 2014; Boyd 2017). This failure is most glaring when it comes to climate25
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2 H. Schoukens
change.1 A similar grim picture emerges when it comes to biodiversity loss.2 Even the26
European Union (EU), which often portrays itself as an environmental frontrunner,27
is no exception to that general rule, with more than 70% of its natural habitats and28
60% of its protected species currently in a dire conservation status.3 Taking stock of29
the limited results on the basis of modern environmental law, a push for more system-30
atic and transformative changes of the existing legal frame is becoming increasingly31
noticeable within the existing literature (Cullinan 2014). For one, it is by no means32
surprising to read into the 2019 report from the Intergovernmental Science-Policy33
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) a call for ‘transforma-34
tive change’, which is further defined as a ‘fundamental, system-wide reorganization35
across technological, economic and social factors, including paradigms, goals and36
values’.4 It is increasingly entertained that our existing legal frameworks poorly37
reflect the eco-centric shift that is needed to curb and, if possible, reverse the ecolog-38
ical decline our planet is witnessing (Gaines 2014; Bosselman 2016). A frequently39
echoed critique regarding the ineffectiveness of modern environmental laws is that40
such regulations are based on the omnipresent Cartesian, dualistic approach to nature41
(Boyd 2017), and often primarily focused on regulating and legalizing the destruction42
of our natural ecosystems (Wood 2014).AQ1 43
Granting legal personhood or, as some put it, ‘rights’ to nature has recently44
emerged as a promising new movement in the legal discourse, with various juris-45
dictions having incorporated ‘rights of nature’ in statutes or laws.5 According to the46
proponents of more eco-centric approaches to law, a legal system in which the envi-47
ronment or nature is a legal person with rights will eventually lead to a more coherent48
and effective approach to certain environmental problems (Shelton 2015). Instead49
of granting rights to nature, the more rights-based approach assumes that nature has50
certain rights—thus leading to the concept ‘rights of nature’. To use the words of51
Professor Stone—whose groundbreaking and influential article ‘Should trees have52
standing’ from 1972 lay at the root of the rise of rights of nature movement—nature53
as a ‘rights holder’ would ‘have a legally recognized worth and dignity in its own54
right and not merely to serve as a means to benefit us’ (Stone 1972).55
1UN Environment, Emissions Gap Report 2018, https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissi
ons-gap-report-2018 (accessed 15 September 2019).
2S. Diaz et al. (ed.), Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on biodiversity
and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (2019), advance unedited version.
3European Environment Agency, State of nature in the EU. Results from reporting under the nature
directives 2007–2012, EEA Technical Report, No. 2/2015.
4See supra, footnote 2.
5For an extensive overview, see: Living Law, Giving Nature a Voice, Legal rights and personhood for
Nature—an analysis of progressive legal developments in other jurisdictions where Nature Rights
have been recognized in national constitutions, other domestic laws and litigation proceedings,
2018, https://www.livinglaw.co.uk/single-post/2018/07/06/Giving-Nature-a-Voice—Granting-Nat
ure-Legal-Rights-a-progressive-path-to-balance-between-people-and-the-nature-world (accessed
15 September 2019).
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 3
The revolutionary idea of granting legal rights to nature generated mixed reac-56
tions in the legal literature of the past decades. Some authors discarded the idea57
as fundamentally inapt to deal with environmental challenges (Elder 1984) or posit58
that—since nature has no traceable ‘voice’—the focus of granting rights is wrong-59
sided (Giagnovaco and Goldstein 1990), while others, such as Nash, took up the60
idea and translated it into a plea for what he dubs ‘biotic rights’ (Nash 1993). That61
said, it remains undisputed to say that this novel governance paradigm has remained62
dormant for several decades at the international forum, with the adoption of the World63
Charter of Nature in 1982 by the General Assembly of the United Nations being a64
notable exception.6 Yet, remarkably so, recent years have witnessed a remarkable65
surge in the number of jurisdictions in which nature has been granted explicit rights66
and personhood. More than four decades after the publication of Stone’s ground-67
breaking article, the country of Ecuador was the first to implement rights of nature in68
its governing laws (Tanasescu 2016),7 with Bolivia quickly following suit (Villalba69
2013).70
As of today, however, the EU remains a notoriously absent actor in this debate.71
At times when rights of nature is emerging even in the United States (Boyd 2017),72
albeit at local level,8 it is remarkable to note that no concrete implementation of73
rights of nature is to be encountered within the EU. Even so, the ongoing ecological74
crisis is also a European one, as is established above. With the exception of one75
modest local ordinance adopted in a Dutch municipality, which contained a plea for76
the explicit legal recognition of the rights of the Wadden Sea,9 no tangible example77
is to be found of the rights of nature within the EU. The EU’s self-image as an78
environmental frontrunner—which appears to be justified in view of the remarkable79
array of progressive environmental directives that have been passed during the past80
decades—might partly help to explain why the EU is currently lagging behind in the81
global movement towards an explicit recognition of rights of nature. This begs the82
question to what extent granting legal personhood to nature might be an effective83
pathway to cure the existing flaws of the EU legislative framework with respect84
to environmental protection. More sceptical authors like Bétaille have argued that85
implementing rights of nature in the EU legal context is unlikely to further the cause of86
environmental restoration seeing that its main substantive tenets are already present87
in the existing legal order (Bétaille 2019).88
This chapter makes the case that the latter, more sceptical position does not89
hold ground. First, it is argued that granting rights of nature not only ties in with90
several prominent Western ideas, championed by renowned and prominent natural91
6World Charter of Nature, A/RES/37/7, United Nations General Assembly (1982).
7More information can be found at https://therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Rights-
for-Nature-Articles-in-Ecuadors-Constitution.pdf (accessed 15 September 2019).
8See, for instance, the granting of legal personhood to Lake Erie by the City of Toledo. For more
information, see https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/feb/28/toledo-lake-erie-personhood-
status-bill-of-rights-algae-bloom (accessed 15 September 2019).
9See for more background: De Waddenzee heeft ook rechten en die horen in de Grondwet
te staan’, https://www.trouw.nl/samenleving/de-waddenzee-heeft-ook-rechten-en-die-horen-in-de-
grondwet-te-staan~a874d8b0/ (accessed 15 September 2019).
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4 H. Schoukens
scientists and ecologists such as Darwin and Leopold, but also presents a unique92
opportunity to move away from the human exceptionalism which has dominated the93
debate regarding personhood. Second, I will submit that granting rights to nature94
has the potential to effectively bolster environmental protection in the EU. Through95
a comprehensive assessment of the precise interplay between the existing EU legal96
order and the prevailing rights of nature template—taking into account the recent97
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU—I will outline the potential obstacles98
and opportunities in this respect.99
Rights of Nature: What, Where, When and How?100
Not Such a Novel Idea, After All?101
Over the past decades, granting substantive rights and legal personhood to nature102
has emerged as a novel practice aimed at breaking down the hierarchical relationship103
between mankind and nature and, as a result, allowing for a more balanced approach104
to economic developments. It is closely linked to the concept of ‘Earth Jurisprudence’105
(Schilmoller and Pelizonn 2013), which entails that the whole Earth Community has106
‘fundamental rights’, including the right to exist and to flourish (Cullinan 2014).107
Human acts that infringe upon those rights are deemed ‘unlawful’. To an unexpected108
audience this rights-based approach might sound outlandish. For, as of today, Western109
law almost exclusively treats the environment, nature and non-human animals as110
property and mere ‘things’ or ‘commodities’, which can be purchased, sold and used111
by humans to their own liking (Stone 1972). Already back in 2017, Singer contended112
that rights ought to be accorded to animals on the basis of sentience, which he defines113
as the capacity for pain and happiness (Singer 1975). In the meantime, leading114
scientists, like the Dutch-American primatologist Frans de Waal, have demonstrated115
that animals, such as primates, are at least capable of proto-moral behaviour (de Waal116
2013).117
In other words, simply maintaining that animals lack moral agency and therefore118
cannot be regarded as a contracting party to the social contract no longer seems to119
be a conclusive argument against granting certain rights to animals (Driessen 2017).120
However, the rights of nature rhetoric goes one step further than the animal rights121
movements (Staker 2017). While the latter, like human rights lawyers, prioritize the122
individual sentient being, rights of nature has a more broad ambit (Chapron et al.123
2019). To be more precise, it seeks to explicitly acknowledge the intrinsic value124
of ecosystems and nature itself. This is revolutionary in itself, especially when put125
against the benchmark of the existing environmental legislation. As Emmegegger126
and Tschentscher succinctly put it: ‘one cannot truly speak about protecting the127
intrinsic value of the environment without granting it explicit substantive rights’128
(Emmenegger and Tschentscher 1994).129
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 5
Advocating for rights for nature is not a recent phenomenon. Already back in130
1897, Henry S. Salt claimed that ‘if we are ever going to do justice to the lower131
races (i.e. animals), we must get rid of the antiquated notion of a ‘great gulf’ fixed132
between them and mankind, and must recognize the common bond of humanity that133
unites all living beings in one universal brotherhood’ (Salt 1894). At the same time,134
Darwin’s scientific findings dealt a significant blow to the prevailing view on the role135
of Mankind: Man should no longer be regarded as a special creature endowed with a136
divine blessing by an omnipresent God (Darwin 1874). This ultimately culminated137
in Aldo Leopold’s famous writings in A Sand County Almanac (1949), in which138
he advocated a different land ethic, ‘which changes the role of Homo sapiens from139
conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it’. In this narrative,140
Leopold held that life forms that share the planet with people should be allowed to141
live ‘as a matter of biotic rights, regardless of the presence or absence of economic142
advantage to us’ (Leopold 1949).143
One of the first ‘legal’ appearances of the idea of turning nature into a rights-144
bearing subject took place in the context of the infamous Sierra Club versus Morton-145
case, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972. The renowned lawsuit revolved146
around the permits granted by the Forest Service, which allowed Disney Enter-147
prises to build a complex of recreational facilities in the Mineral King Valley in the148
Sierra Nevada of California. During the proceedings, Christopher Stone authored his149
famous article, in which he posited that nature should be granted legal personhood,150
which entailed that it could be represented in court through a system of guardians.151
Ultimately, Stone’s view was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided152
to deny the environmental organization standing. However, Justice Douglas paid lip153
service to Stone’s thesis in his dissenting opinion.10154
Rights, Standing and Legal Remedies155
It is instructive to go back to Stone’s original thesis in order to identify the most156
recurring features of the rights of nature rationale. At the time, Stone put forward157
the following three core elements that are to be observed when implementing rights158
of nature: first, the rights of nature rationale entails granting legal personhood to159
nature, which implies it has the necessary standing to launch proceedings in its own160
right; second, in determining the granting of relief, courts are required to take into161
account its own (ecological) injury, which goes beyond the personal damages incurred162
by private individuals; third, that relief must run to the benefit of it. A common163
denominator in terms of substantive rights is the steadfast emphasis that is put on164
preserving the integrity of a specific ecosystem (e.g. a river) or nature as a whole, as165
is the case in Ecuador and Bolivia, for instance. As was also underlined by Stone,166
rights of nature does not necessarily entail that nature should be granted ‘absolute’167
rights in every single instance. As is the case with several human rights, such as the168
10Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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6 H. Schoukens
right to free speech, rights of nature are not necessarily ‘absolute’ either (Stone 1972).169
Rights of nature is often aligned with a more liberal approach to standing before court,170
which might fundamentally alter the assessment courts need to make when issuing171
an injunction or granting damages. Since nature lacks a ‘voice’, virtually all of the172
recent manifestations of rights of nature entail some sort of guardianship approach,173
which ensures an effective voice for the environment even when no authorities or174
individuals are willing to start legal action on their own behalf (Shelton 2015).175
Guardians at Work176
Ecuador was one of the first countries to explicitly implement rights of nature in177
its legal order. When revising its constitution in 2008, the country chose to place178
the concept of Buen Vivir—which translates as ‘harmonious coexistence’—at the179
heart of its novel constitutional legal order, thereby reasserting the interdependency180
between nature, people and society. From the preamble of the revised Constitution181
alone, one can infer that nature no longer is to be approached as a commodity. Since182
the much-heralded revision of 2008, the Ecuadorian Constitution also explicitly183
includes a section articulating the rights of nature. Pursuant to Article 71 of the184
Constitution, ‘Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the185
right to integral respect for its existence and the maintenance and regeneration of its186
life cycles, structure, functions, and evolutionary processes’.187
Along similar lines, the Ecuadorian Constitution now grants nature the rights to be188
restored when damaged.11 It also requires the government to prevent or restrict activ-189
ities leading to species extinction, ecosystem destruction and permanent alteration190
of life cycles.12 In addition to recognizing the rights of indigenous people to remain191
on their ancestral lands, the provisions grant ‘all persons, communities, peoples, and192
nations’ the right to call upon the public authorities to enforce the rights of nature.13193
This entails that there is no requirement to prove a personal interest when relying194
upon nature’s rights before court. Interestingly so, Ecuador is also the first country195
in which the legally recognized rights to nature were applied before court (Kotzé196
and Calzadilla 2017). The Vilcabamba River case, where two plaintiffs sought legal197
relief on behalf of the river in order to stop the detrimental impact it suffered from198
an authorized road project, was dubbed the ‘first rights of nature lawsuit’ of the199
world. And, most importantly, nature ‘won’. Ultimately the Court, with reference200
to the precautionary principle, upheld the claim reasoning that injuries to nature are201
‘generational damage’, which will not only impact present generations but also future202
people.14203
11Ecuadorian Constitution, Article 72.
12Ibid, Article 73.
13Ibid, Article 71.
14R.F. Wheeeler and E.G. Huddle v. Attorney General of the State of Loja (2011), Judgment No.
11121–2011 (2011, March 2011).
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 7
In other lawsuits, rights of nature were invoked by plaintiffs as well and, in some204
instances, even by the judges themselves. A preliminary case-law analysis show-205
cases that not all these attempts were successful (Kauffman and Martin 2017). The206
lack of a clear hierarchy within the constitutional framework, which grants signif-207
icant leeway for authorities when balancing rights of nature with other economic208
considerations, is to be singled out as a major shortcoming. The latter is starkly209
demonstrated by the unsuccessful lawsuits aimed at halting the construction and210
operation of an open pit copper mine—dubbed ‘Mirador’—at a vulnerable ecolog-211
ical site.15 Neither the Ecuadorian nor the Bolivian government has fundamentally212
altered their resources-based economic policies in view of the right of nature-based213
legislation. Yet Ecuadorian judges are increasingly prone to unilaterally applying214
rights of nature, even when contested from a governmental point of view (Kauffman215
and Martin 2017). Also, the 2015 ruling of the Ecuadorian constitutional court, which216
reasserted the precedence of rights of nature over economic interests, appears to be217
slowly trickling down to other jurisprudence, further highlighting the importance of218
the new paradigm and its legal teeth (Kauffman and Martin 2018).16219
In sharp contrast to the Ecuadorian model, the New Zealand model opts for a220
different approach, namely, granting legal personhood to specific ecosystems. The221
Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act, which was passed by the New Zealand222
Parliament in 2017, arguably represents one of the most inspiring and comprehen-223
sive efforts to operationalize rights of nature.17 It is most renowned for explicitly224
recognizing the Whanganui River, a sacred river for the Whanganui Iwi, the Maori225
people who see the river as their ancestor, as bearer of rights and responsibilities226
equivalent to a person (Hsiao 2013). The Act itself has to be approached as the result227
of a long-standing physical and legal battle by Maori people against the colonial228
domination of the river and its water, which lasted more than 150 (!) years. The229
wording of the Act reflects a clear concession to the Maori view, which recognizes230
the river as a whole, living, spiritual being (Iorns Magallanes 2013). The Act now231
recognizes the river and all its tributaries as a single legal entity dubbed Te Awa232
Tupua, which has rights and interests, and is the ‘owner’ of its own river bed.18 Key233
to the management, which is aimed at preserving the integrity of the river system234
as a whole, is the appointment of two custodians—one by the Crown and the other235
by the Whanganui Iwi—which are mandated to perform the guardianship role on236
behalf of the river.19 They are expected to act in a similar manner as legal guardians237
represent children and place the interests of the river central to their actions.238
15On the latest development regarding the Mirador project, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
ecuador-mining/ecuador-begins-large-scale-mining-at-mirador-copper-project-idUSKCN1UD36F
(accessed 15 September 2019).
16Ecuadorian Constitutional Court, 2015. Sentence NO. 166-15-SEP-CC, case no. 0507-12-EP.
17Te Awua Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, New Zealand Act No. 7.,
Sections 12, 14 and 15.
18Ibid, section.
19Ibid, section.
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8 H. Schoukens
As of today, however, no specific actions have been brought before the national239
courts in New Zealand on behalf of the nature which has been accorded legal person-240
ality through specifically tailored legislation. Likewise, the new legislation has not led241
to massive expropriation programmes: the property rights of corporations, farmers242
and other inhabitants still remain valid. Pollution still exists. This being the case, the243
recognition of rights of nature does not necessarily require the adoption of specific244
legislation but can also involve the judiciary. In some instances, plaintiffs might file245
a lawsuit in order to seek legal personhood for a natural entity, such as a river. In246
2007, this strategy was followed by some plaintiffs in the U.S. State of Colorado,247
seeking a declaratory ruling which would hold that the Colorado River was a person248
possessing rights, among others the ‘right to exist, flourish, regenerate, be restored249
and naturally evolve’. However, the plaintiffs ultimately decided to drop the case.20250
Similar lawsuits have yielded interesting rulings in countries such as India21 and,251
more recently, Colombia. In a 2015 decision, the Colombian Constitutional Court252
decided to grant the Atrato River, its tributaries and its basin ‘the right to be protected,253
preserved and restored by the State and the communities’.22 Interestingly, the court254
also decided to designate two custodians for the management of the river, thereby255
reflecting the recent developments in New Zealand. A similar pattern is noticeable256
in another legal procedure relating to the Colombian Amazon Rainforest, where the257
Supreme Court was persuaded to declare the area of the Amazon rainforest within its258
national borders an ‘entity subject to rights’.23 While the recognition of the Amazon259
rainforest as a legal person was not totally alien to the plaintiffs’ claims, the eager-260
ness with which the Colombian judges made a bridge between a human rights-based261
litigation strategy and rights of nature is remarkable.262
Inherent Obstacles, Limited Effectiveness and Recurring263
Criticism264
The increased popularity of rights of nature has also triggered some criticism and265
scorn by several scholars.24 However, Stone had already anticipated some of the266
most perennial criticism by stating that ‘(t)hroughout legal history, each successive267
extension of rights to some new entity has been, thereto, a bit unthinkable (…) each268
time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new ‘entity’, this proposal is269
20For more background information, see https://www.aspenjournalism.org/2017/12/05/colorado-
river-personhood-case-pulled-by-proponents/ (accessed 15 September 2019).
21Uttarakhand High Court, Mohd. Salim v. State of Utturakhand & Others (2017); Uttarakhand
High Court, Lalit Miglan v State of Utturakhand & Others (2017). As indicated above, these rulings
were provisionally halted by a ruling of the Indian Supreme Court.
22Constitutional Court of Colombia, case T-633/16, Center for Social Justice Studies et al. v.
President of Colombia et al., Judgment of 10 November 2016.
23Supreme Court of Colombia, judgment STC 4360-2018 of 5 April 2018, Sect. 13.
24For an overview, see Burdon and Williams (2016).
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 9
bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable’ (Stone 1972). In a similar vein, he270
posited that even the fact that only humans are moral agents and, as a result, nature271
should not be granted rights since it is—evidently—incapable of voicing its own272
‘feelings’ or interests, does not present a definite obstacle (Stone 2012). For infants,273
incompetents, terminally comatose and corporations have also been granted certain274
rights and can claim standing in legal procedures.275
I strongly concur with Stone’s view. It is relatively easy to push aside rights of276
nature as an exercise in empty rhetoric and advocate a better enforcement of the277
existing rules. Yet rights of nature is not to be approached as an all-encompassing278
alternative for the existing environmental legislation. Rather, it is to be seen as the279
basis for a shift towards a novel normative approach to nature protection, which280
goes beyond the well-entrenched dualistic view on nature and mankind. However,281
it is indeed widely accepted that personhood is not limited to people, who remain282
just one of the two main types of persons. Besides human beings, who the law283
tags as ‘natural (or physical) persons’, the law also acknowledges the existence284
of legal (artificial) persons. The main difference between both categories is that285
the latter requires a deliberate decision by the lawmaker to artificially create legal286
personhood (Pietrzykowski 2018). And whereas supporters of the so-called ‘will or287
choice theories’ assume that ‘rights’ should in principle be aimed at the protection288
of the right’s holders free will (Hart 1982), champions of the so-called ‘interest289
theories’, such as Raz, link the usage of the concept of rights to ‘mere’ interests290
that the lawmakers regard as deserving legal protection against third parties (Raz291
1986). Decades of research into animals’ abilities to communicate have yielded some292
groundbreaking results and underline the moral capabilities of many animals (de Waal293
2013; Driessen 2017). Surely, intelligent and sentient animals such as Elephants,294
Killer Whales and Primates possess interests that merit legal protection. But even295
at a more principal level, I see no real difference between granting certain rights296
to ecosystems and corporations. While we consider corporations and companies to297
constitute the foundation of our current economic system—which explains why case298
law has acknowledged that corporations can be accorded certain human rights and299
responsibilities that are enjoyed by natural persons (La Folette and Maser 2017)—a300
similar move can equally be envisaged for ecosystems. That is, if we are prepared to301
accept their primary importance for society.302
Even so, critics such as Sagoff and, more recently, Warnock insist that it remains303
impossible to know whether a river or mountain really prefers to be ‘preserved’ or304
exploited (Sagoff 1994; Warnock 2012). Along similar lines, one might argue that305
the notion of rights is not the appropriate instrument to bring about the shift in envi-306
ronmental governance needed to protect the environment. As stated above, this view307
only holds ground within the framework of the so-called ‘will theories’. It presup-308
poses that we restrict the notion of personhood to human individuals, based on our309
unique moral capabilities. A similar rationale was also upheld in the dismissal of a310
habeas corpus action on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee held in captivity, by the311
New York Supreme Court in 2014. The court noted that law is the result of a social312
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10 H. Schoukens
compact.25 Humans can enter into a ‘social compact’ whereas animals and a fortiori313
nature are barred from doing so since they cannot assume certain duties. However,314
this reasoning also remains challengeable in view of the mounting criticism regarding315
the concept of human ‘free will’. For one, an increasing number of thinkers call into316
question the artificial premise underlying the liberal belief in feelings and the free317
choices of the individual (Harari 2018). Against this backdrop, which openly refutes318
the notion of ‘human exceptionalism’, it is no longer unthinkable to argue for a third319
category of non-personal subjects of law for certain animal species (Pietrzykowski320
2018) or, when it comes to natural entities such as rivers and mountains, to delib-321
erately accord them the status of subjects with certain rights, just as we have done322
with companies and corporations.323
Yet another line of criticism discards rights of nature as a ‘quick legal fix’,324
which will bring about little result if not accompanied by social reform (Burdon and325
Williams 2016). Evidently, enforcement remains a key challenge to be addressed326
when effectively implementing rights of nature (Bétaille 2019). Even so, as demon-327
strated above, the number of lawsuits in which rights of nature is successfully being328
invoked is steadfastly rising in Ecuador, attesting to the potency of rights of nature329
if effectively relied upon before national courts (Kaufmann and Martin 2017). By330
analogy, one could also easily dismiss the usage of the concept of inalienable human331
rights in view of the persistent human rights violations that still occur in many places332
in the world.333
To be fair, the disruptive effect of rights of nature will evidently give rise to334
legal challenges, which is starkly illustrated by the recent legal challenges that were335
launched by the farmers against the local ordinance granting legal personhood to Lake336
Erie. Such cases are to be approached as an illustration of the (often) limited local337
competences, which might turn local legislation regarding rights of nature into mere338
rhetorical instruments for the furtherance of rights of nature. However, they are also339
indicative of the uphill battle that is to be fought in order to translate rights of nature340
into our anthropocentric legal order. In other words, they underline the transformative341
potential of rights of nature and should thus not be used as an argument to dismiss342
the novel paradigm altogether.343
Interim Conclusion344
In this section, it has been established that rights of nature clearly has the potential of345
creating a novel normative groundwork which allows for a fundamental shift towards346
a more eco-centric-based governance. Evidently, the simple implementation rights347
of nature will not constitute a definitive and all-inclusive answer for the impending348
ecological crisis. However, the majority of the criticism directed at rights of nature349
25State of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (Third Judicial Department), Non-Human
Rights Project on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery and Circle L Trailer Sales, Judgment (Opinion) of 4
December 2014.
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 11
can be easily refuted, either by referring to the human exceptionalism it presupposes350
or by referring to the fact that corporate personhood is also to be seen as a human351
construct.352
The Interplay Between the EU Legal Order and Rights353
of Nature: An Environmental Frontrunner, in Word354
and Practice?355
The EU as a Self-declared Environmental Frontrunner?356
Having thoroughly demonstrated why rights of nature could indeed be approached as357
a crucial new template for addressing the current economic plight, the second question358
to be addressed in this paper is the potential interplay with existing EU law. To begin359
with, on the European Commission’s website it is stated that the ‘(t)he EU has some360
of the world’s highest environmental standards. Environment policy helps green the361
EU economy, protect nature, and safeguard the health and quality of life of people362
living in the EU’.26 At first glance, this self-praise seems justified. The progressive363
March forward of EU environmental law cannot be negated, from the adoption of the364
first EU environmental action programme over the adoption of several progressive365
environmental directives to the introduction of an environmental title in the EC Treaty366
by the 1986 Single Act. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty continued this progressive367
evolution by making the environment an official EU policy area, whereas the Treaty368
of Amsterdam (1997) laid down the duty to integrate environmental protection into369
all sectoral policies with a view to promoting sustainable development.370
This resulted in several—albeit often half-hearted—attempts to further ‘green’371
policy areas, such as the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the common fisheries372
policy (CFP). During the past two decades, combatting climate change has become373
a top priority, which has also led to the inclusion of this specific policy goal in the374
Lisbon Treaty of 2009 (Vedder 2010).375
As of today no explicit reference to rights of nature can be found in primary376
EU law. Nonetheless, Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) puts377
‘sustainable development’ at the centre of the EU’s internal market, specifying that378
the ‘internal market (…) shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based379
on balanced economic growth (…) and a high level of protection and improvement of380
the quality of the environment’. In turn, Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning381
of the European Union (TFEU) fleshes out the ‘integration principle’, pursuant to382
which environment protection requirements are to be integrated into the definition383
and the implementation of the EU’s policies and activities, ‘in particular with a view384
to promoting sustainable development’ (Hovden 2018).385
26https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/environment_en (accessed 15 September 2019).
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12 H. Schoukens
Of course, a mere reference to ‘sustainable development’ does not guarantee386
that, when balancing economic, social and ecological considerations, the latter will387
ultimately prevail. Most authors have accepted that—in view of its very broad and388
vague wording—the provisions linked to sustainable development are not enforce-389
able before court (Verschuuren 2016). Yet, in spite of their lack of legal teeth, these390
provisions have led to the adoption of numerous secondary legislation—which is391
enforceable—and action programmes. For instance, the EU’s progressive imple-392
mentation of the precautionary principle, which entails that in case of uncertainty,393
instructions may still be given to remove harmful products, such as certain pesticides,394
from the market, is to be singled out as one of the major achievements of the EU395
environment policy of the past decades (Schoukens 2018).396
It is impossible to treat all relevant pieces of EU environmental legislation in the397
context of this chapter. Given the focus of rights of nature advocates on rivers, nature398
and pollution, I will briefly focus on the main pieces of EU legislation which address399
these very sub-topics. As a general remark, it has to be borne in mind that the EU400
has not chosen to grant legal personhood to rivers, nor to protected sites. Where401
water protection is concerned, most international rivers and waterways within the402
EU are covered by the existing international agreements, which detail the cooper-403
ative management of international watercourses. More broadly speaking, however,404
reference has to be made to the EU’s Water Framework Directive, adopted in the year405
2000,27 which obligates the Member States to achieve good qualitative and quantita-406
tive status of all water bodies (including marine waters up to one nautical mile from407
shore) through the adoption of river basin management plans by 2015. In turn, the408
SEA28 and EIA Directives29 require authorities to integrate environmental consid-409
erations into decision-making procedures with respect to plans, programmes and410
projects liable to generate significant effects on the environment. A further attempt411
to operationalize the polluter pays principle is offered by the 2014 Environmental412
Liability Directive, which requires preventive and remedial action in the context of413
‘pure’ ecological damage.30 Lastly, the EU has also adopted two pieces of legisla-414
tion explicitly aimed at halting the biodiversity loss within its territory. The 1979415
Birds Directive,31 which was later complemented by the more cross-cutting Habitats416
27Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
establishing a framework for community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L 371/1.
28Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the
assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L 197/30.
29Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on
the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [2011] OJ L
26/1.
30Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on envi-
ronmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of Environmental Liability [2004]
OJ L 143/56.
31Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds [1979] OJ L 103/1 (further
referred to as ‘Birds Directive’). The initial Birds Directive was codified in European Parliament
and Council Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds [2010] OJ L 20/7.
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 13
Directive,32 not only explicitly protects hundreds of endangered species within the417
EU but also obligates the Member States to designate the most ecologically valu-418
able parts of their territory as protected sites (Natura 2000). Stretching over 18% of419
the EU’s land area and almost 9.5% of its marine territory, the EU hosts the largest420
coordinated network of protected areas in the world.421
Beyond explicit legislation, the so-called multiannual Environment Action422
Programmes, which put forward legislative proposals and goals for the EU environ-423
ment policy, are continuously setting a high water mark in the realm of environmental424
protection as well. The 7th Environment Action Programme, which was adopted by425
the Council and Parliament in 2013 under the title ‘Living well, within the limits426
of our planet’ set out the main objectives for the environmental policy and gover-427
nance within the EU for this decade33 Underpinning this vision is the recognition428
that Europe’s economic prosperity and well-being is intrinsically linked to its natural429
environment. Whereas such claims do not explicitly pay lip service to rights of nature,430
they at least recognize the intrinsic interdependency between the long-term survival431
of our economic system and the proper conservation of our natural ecosystems.432
Pertaining to the pressing challenge of combatting climate change, the EU adopted433
a 2030 climate & energy framework in 2014 that puts forward a 2030 target to reduce434
greenhouse emissions by 40% of 1990 levels.34 Likewise, in its Biodiversity Strategy,435
the EU has committed itself to halting the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services436
as well as restoring 15% of its degraded ecosystems by 2020.35437
A More Ambivalent Practice?438
The picture painted above appears impressive at first glance. In 2013, the Euro-439
pean Environment Agency identified a staggering number of 63 legally binding440
targets and 68 non-binding objectives set out in EU policy covering the 2010–2050441
period (Hovden 2018). However, in spite of its lofty policy ambitions and its progres-442
sive environmental directives and regulations, the EU’s environmental outlook still443
remains bleak. Admittedly, looking back on the last 40 years, one has to acknowl-444
edge that the local environment is in some places arguably in a better state than445
in the 1970s, at least in some respects (e.g. water quality). Yet the European State446
and Outlook Report (SOER) 2015, compiled by the European Environment Agency447
32Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora
[1992] OJ L 206/7.
33Decision No 1386/2013/EU of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Action Programme to
2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’ (2013) OJ L 354/171.
34For more background: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/climate-change/2030-cli
mate-and-energy-framework/ (accessed 15 September 2019).
35European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.
The Mid-Term Review of the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, COM(2015) 478 final.
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14 H. Schoukens
(EEA), provides for a grim reading when zooming in on the global outlook.36 While448
significant improvements have been made in reducing ecosystem exposure to excess449
levels of acidification, the majority of the protected nature within Western Europe450
is still exposed to air pollution levels that exceed the so-called critical loads for451
eutrophication, i.e. the upper limit that an ecosystem can absorb without signifi-452
cantly damaging its structure or function. These bleak conclusions were subsequently453
repeated in the 2015 Mid-Term Review of the EU Biodiversity Strategy.37 Notwith-454
standing recent ‘greening’ efforts, most studies still point out that farmland nature,455
and especially birds, is in steep decline.38 Likewise, a lot of progress still has to be456
made when it comes to sustainable fishing practices, with more than 50% of the EU’s457
fish stocks being subject to catch regimes which are above the maximum sustainable458
yield.39459
Even the EU’s track record when it comes to combatting climate change, arguably460
the most pressing environmental challenge for the twenty-first country, is far from461
perfect. Even though the EU is meeting its objectives under the Kyoto Protocol,462
many of the goods needed for maintaining our current western lifestyle are imported463
from elsewhere around the globe, which means that part of the EU’s CO2 emissions464
(i.e. polluting activities) are outsourced to other parts of the world, where legal stan-465
dards are more relaxed in terms of environmental protection. European businesses,466
consumers and policymakers have relatively limited knowledge and influence to467
bring about sustainable changes in the production processes.40 As to the new reduc-468
tion pledges, several NGOs have attested that they are not ambitious enough in view469
of the goals set out by the Paris Agreement.41470
Procedural and Substantive Obstacles: No Standing471
for Nature and Climate, After All?472
No Explicit Recognition of Rights of Nature in the EU Treaties473
The lack of express acknowledgment of rights of nature does not necessarily mean474
that the main underlying principles of the rights of nature discourse described above475
are not implicitly endorsed by or reflected in the existing EU legal order. Seminal476
concepts, such as the precautionary principle, are well rooted in the current EU477
36European Environment Agency, The European Environment: State and Outlook 2015: Synthesis
Report, 2015, at pp. 8–9.
37Ibid.
38See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/mar/21/europe-faces-biodiversity-obl
ivion-after-collapse-in-french-bird-populations (accessed 15 September 2019).
39European Environment Agency, supra note 37, p. 74.
40Ibid, pp. 93–95.
41See https://euobserver.com/environment/142591 (accessed 15 September 2019).
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Rights of Nature in the European Union … 15
legal order. However, a more detailed analysis that aptly reveals that the EU is inca-478
pable of adequately addressing the systematic challenges arising in the context of479
environmental policy becomes all the more pressing. The EEA itself concluded in480
its 2015 report that ‘(t)he transition to a green economy is a long-term, multidi-481
mensional process that will require a move away from the current linear economic482
model of ‘take-make-consume-dispose’ which relies on large quantities of easily483
accessible resources and energy. This will necessitate profound changes in dominant484
institutions, practices, technologies, policies, lifestyles and thinking’.42485
Interestingly, the EEA itself proposes to ‘recalibrate’ the existing policy486
approaches in order to allow for such a transition. As of today, little evidence is487
put forward that the EU institutions are willing to effectively implement the shift488
towards ecological law. In line with the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustain-489
able Development, the focus within the EU is still on ‘green economy’, while topics490
such as ‘degrowth’, which calls into question one of the dominant paradigms of491
our current economic system, remain notoriously absent in the current discourse.492
The underlying premise still appears to be that ‘infinite economic growth’ can be493
aligned with an improved environmental performance. In itself, this is not surprising494
if one takes into account the wording of Article 3 TEU, which links sustainable495
development to ‘balanced economic growth’, without specifying any requirements496
for a balancing exercise needed in scenarios in which ecological and economic inter-497
ests might clash. Even the presence of Article 11 TFEU, which merely requires the498
Union’s actual environmental protection standards to be integrated into all relevant499
policy sectors, is incapable of ensuring adequate environmental protection through500
the other sectoral policies (Hovden 2018).501
According to Somsen, ‘the absence in EU environmental law of an ecological502
equivalent to human dignity (ecological integrity) implies boundless institutional503
discretion to preside over and acquiesce in the destruction of the environment’504
(Somsen 2017). Bosselmann, in turn, argues that a rule prohibiting harm to the505
integrity of ecological systems is fundamental, which is currently absent in modern506
environmental law (Bosselman 2016). Granting substantive rights to nature has507
precisely emerged as a novel practice aimed at breaking down the hierarchical rela-508
tionship between mankind and nature and, as a result, allowing for a more balanced509
approach to economic development, banning or at least phasing out practices that510
are fundamentally at odds with an ecosystem’s resilience.511
Therefore, the preliminary conclusion appears to be that the EU’s environmental512
instruments are falling short of the above-mentioned rationale underlying rights of513
nature. Some authors go as far as to qualify the EU as ‘ecologically illiterate’ (Hovden514
2018). As I understand, there are two main issues here. First, EU environmental law515
is characterized by a piecemeal and reactive approach. Crucial policy areas, such as516
the CAP, have not consistently been made subject to the environmental principles laid517
down by the EU environmental title in the TFEU. No hierarchical relationship can be518
observed here, which renders the achievement of the overarching goals very unlikely.519
Second, the EU’s environmental policy in itself, as well as the primary principles520
42European Environment Agency, supra note 37, at p. 155.
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16 H. Schoukens
upon which the EU legal order is built, is predominantly anthropocentric, to the extent521
that they refuse to explicitly acknowledge the increasing interdependency between522
nature and mankind.523
Procedural Impediments and Unexpected Opportunities: Can524
EU’s Endangered Nature Be Represented Before Court?525
This being said, it is interesting to analyse how the rights of nature rationale could526
be further implemented and/or operationalized within the existing EU legal order,527
which mainly has an anthropocentric outlook. For, as is demonstrated by the above-528
mentioned recent manifestations of rights of nature, it is not uncommon to implement529
rights of nature within the context of anthropocentric legal schemes. This was, for530
instance, the case in New Zealand and Colombia. And the EU’s comprehensive legal531
framework in respect of environmental protection provides an excellent case study532
to outline the most seminal issues to be addressed in this context.533
In this respect, a first necessary stop relates to the provisions on access to justice in534
environmental cases at EU level. As demonstrated above, liberal standing for nature535
in court was one of the principal reasons why Stone pitched this revolutionary idea in536
1974. Stone’s plea did not stop at simply advocating a more liberalized approach to537
standing for environmental NGOs in cases where nature is at peril. He went one step538
further and claimed that natural objects should be granted the benefit of standing.539
This would give a host of potential guardians, such as environmental NGOs, the540
possibility to enforce nature’s rights. Stone differentiated between two situations:541
bringing a claim as a custodian on behalf of a protected species is to be regarded542
as completely different from filing a lawsuit as an environmental NGO in order to543
promote their own statutory objectives (Stone 2010).544
Arguably Stone’s narrative has not managed to create a shift in the discourse on545
standing for nature in the United States. Granted, in the famous 1991 Palila-case,546
an endangered bird which is protected under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, a547
plaintiff was seeking relief on behalf of the protected bird. And surprisingly, the548
Ninth Circuit Court seemed to concur, holding that the Palila ‘also has legal status549
and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right’.43 However, in550
all of the subsequent cases in the United States in which the standing of protected551
species was upheld, more traditional plaintiffs were present, such as environmental552
NGOs.44553
This is no different in the EU legal order, where nature also has no direct standing.554
As already alluded to, much has changed in the international framework regarding555
environmental accountability and justice since the 1960s. With the adoption of the556
1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making557
43Palila v. Hawaii Dept. Of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991).
4461F Supp 2d 1001 (ND Cal 1999).
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and Access in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Treaty)45 within the framework of558
the Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the so-called ‘procedural environ-559
mental rights’ granted to citizens and NGOs were further recognized and translated560
into more clear-cut international duties. Also, the EU has ratified the Aarhus Treaty.46561
And although this international agreement remains notoriously silent on the topic562
of standing for natural objects and allows Member States to use certain standing563
criteria, it clearly obliges State Parties to reconsider traditional standing approaches,564
by virtue of which almost all environmental NGOs would be barred from challenging565
acts or omissions contravening environmental law (Schoukens 2015).566
While a detailed analysis of the provisions on access to justice at EU level evidently567
falls outside of the scope of this chapter, I argue that three important stumbling blocks568
are to be overcome in order to operationalize wider standing for nature in the EU569
legal order.570
First and foremost, there is the prevailing strict interpretation of the standing571
requirements enshrined in primary EU law, which renders direct access to justice572
before EU courts against EU acts largely illusionary in the context of environmental573
cases (Schoukens 2015). During the past decades several environmental NGOs have574
relentlessly tried to challenge the legality of EU acts in light of the environmental575
principles that are enshrined in the EU constitutional treaties. However, all of these576
actions have failed due to the prevailing interpretation that is given by the CJEU to577
the standing requirements set out in Article 263(4) of the TFEU (Schoukens 2019). In578
spite of wide-shared criticism and the subsequent adoption of the 2006 Aarhus Regu-579
lation,47 which was precisely aimed at mitigating the relatively harsh jurisprudence580
with respect to standing in environmental cases, the plight of environmental NGOs581
remains. And thus potentially unsustainable EU decisions in the sphere of pesti-582
cides, genetically modified organisms, air quality as well as fisheries policy—the583
latter being an exclusive EU competence—are virtually immune from legal chal-584
lenges by the environmental movement. Nature’s interest cannot be defended in this585
context. Even a recent ‘condemnation’ by the Aarhus Compliance Committee for586
the lack of effective legal remedies available at EU level was unable to persuade the587
EU courts to revisit their conservative approach towards standing in environmental588
cases.48589
This lack of standing in environmental cases significantly hinders a further mani-590
festation of rights of nature at EU level. For instance, in the recent Melifera-case,591
45Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, done at Aarhus, Denmark, 25 July 1998 (‘Aarhus Convention’)
(1999) 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517.
46Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion on behalf of the European
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making
and access to justice in environmental matters (2005) OJ L124/1.
47Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 September 2006
on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community
institutions and bodies (2006) OJ L 264/13.
48Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) (European Union), adopted on 17 March 2017.
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18 H. Schoukens
which revolved around a legal challenge by several environmental NGOs of the Euro-592
pean Commission’s decision relating to the approval period of the active substance593
glyphosate (a controversial weed killer), the General Court refused to allow envi-594
ronmental NGOs that promote the preservation of endangered bees to seek a legal595
review of the latter act.49 Likewise, the General Court refused to reconsider its long-596
standing approach to standing for the environment in the first EU climate case. In its597
2019 decision, the European General Court dismissed the legal action on procedural598
grounds. It was held that climate change affects all Europeans in many different ways599
and therefore the plaintiffs did not meet the strict standing requirement needed to600
challenge the contested acts.50601
And thus, whereas Article 71 of Ecuador’s Constitution grants liberal standing602
to all persons willing to enforce the rights of nature or, alternatively, other recent603
manifestations of rights of nature grant specifically appointed custodians the right604
to file legal claims on behalf of nature, the EU system of legal remedies does not605
appear to provide for much hope for rights of nature advocates. Even an indirect606
representation of endangered nature before an EU court via environmental NGOs607
seems to be illusionary. Nature remains voiceless at EU level.608
Fortunately, this major deficiency of the EU legal order is somehow offset by the609
relatively progressive case law of the EU courts when it comes to access to justice610
for environmental NGOs at national level. A string of recent decisions of the CJEU611
underlines its willingness to have more liberal standing in environmental cases at612
national level, where permits for construction works and industrial facilities can be613
challenged. The 2009 ruling of the CJEU in a Slovakian case in which decisions614
to hunt brown bears were challenged by Slovakian NGOs is a standout case for615
rights of nature. Here, the EU judges held that effective judicial protection is to616
be provided by national courts in cases where the fate of EU-protected species is at617
stake.51 One might put forward that this helped the local NGO to indirectly guarantee618
the interests of protected brown bears in view of the purported hunting schemes. A619
similar rationale led the CJEU to dismiss the so-called German Schutznorm, which620
prevented German NGOs from filing lawsuits on behalf of EU-protected sites which621
are part of the afore-mentioned Natura 2000 Network.52622
It is hard not to see in recent jurisprudence a beacon of hope for more rights-623
based approaches to environmental protection in the EU. Crucially, however, one624
needs to underline that—as of today—not a single EU or national court has held625
that EU-protected species should be granted direct standing before national courts.626
Moreover, seeing that a similar liberal approach has not prevailed in the context627
of private individuals, it still remains to be seen whether the recent jurisprudential628
evolutions are apt to move in the direction of the liberal standing for the environment629
as a whole, which seems to underpin many of the concrete manifestations of rights630
49Case T-600/15 Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe) (2016) ECLI:EU:T:2016:601,
para. 40–56.
50Case T-330/18, Armando Carvalho et al. (2019) ECLI:EU:T:2019:324, para. 41–54.
51Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK I (2011) ECLI:EU:C:2011:125, para. 50.
52Case C-115/09, Trianel (201)] ECR I-03673, par. 46.
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of nature (Schoukens 2018). If environmental NGOs lack funding or have strategic631
considerations not to file lawsuits on behalf of EU-protected nature, the latter remains632
at the discretion of national or regional competent agencies.633
This being the case, reference is to be made to the European Commission, which634
can equally step in as guardian for EU-protected nature. However, one needs to635
bear in mind that Stone himself rejected an approach by which public authorities636
are to be framed as a performant guardian of nature or the environment (Stone637
1972). Several authors have not refrained from criticizing the ambivalent role of the638
European Commission in enforcing EU nature conservation law (Krämer 2015). The639
Commission enjoys full discretion when using the infringement procedure. That said,640
the recent infringement proceedings launched by the European Commission against641
Poland with respect to its destructive logging practices in the Bialowieza forest642
forcibly illustrate that the European Commission, if found willing and able, can643
nevertheless function as an effective guardian.53 Of course, the latter case constitutes644
but one piece of anecdotical evidence: for every primeval forest that is saved, many645
other ‘voiceless’ nature disappears. And hence death by discretion is still lurking646
behind the corner.647
Substantive Flaws and Deficiencies: Going Beyond Legal648
Formalism, Protecting Ecological Integrity in the EU?649
Next to the procedural obstacles analysed above, the existing EU environmental650
legislation also contains important substantive loopholes when it comes to providing651
sufficient protection for our threatened nature. A first notable shortcoming of EU652
environmental law relates to the lack of an imperative of preserving ecological653
integrity in the EU treaties, alongside the notable absence of an overarching and654
binding No Net Loss instrument in secondary EU law. The lack of a clear-cut ban on655
activities liable to significantly impact EU’s vulnerable ecosystems still marks the656
relative inaptness of the EU legal order at moving forward towards an ecosystem-657
based approach. Although the Habitats Directive is to be lauded for its focus on658
setting up an EU-wide ecological network of protected areas—the so-called Natura659
2000 Network—the concept of ‘ecosystem’ is in itself not explicitly mentioned in660
the Habitats Directive. In fact, Natura 2000 leaves more than 80% of the EU terri-661
tory ‘unprotected’. Many endangered insect species, such as endangered bees, are662
not listed among the strictly protected species included in Annex IV to the Habitats663
Directives. As of today, the EU Nature Directives do not contain clear-cut restora-664
tion mandates for such ‘ordinary nature’, either. In close relation to these findings665
is the fact that the duty to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is666
still being approached as a mere ‘procedural’ tool, which downplays its relevance667
53Case C-441/17R, Commission v Poland (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:877.
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for impacting the outcome of authorization procedures for unsustainable projects668
affecting not strictly protected nature in the EU.54669
Second, even within the context of strictly protected areas and species, pieces of670
legislation such as the EU Habitats Directive contain some leeway, which ultimately671
might result in the further decline of protected biodiversity. For one, the protected672
status of endangered species might always be lifted, which could result in the loss673
of protection for species like Gray wolves, whose presence remains controversial674
in many rural areas (Chapron et al. 2019). Even more so, the Habitats Directive675
contains a large number of derogation clauses, which entails that destruction of676
protected nature can be legalized if the right procedures are followed. For instance,677
pursuant to Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, plans and projects which can678
give rise to significant effects on an EU-protected site can nonetheless be carried679
out ‘for imperative reasons of overriding public interest’. Although the substantive680
requirements to be met when applying the derogation clauses are relatively strict,681
administrative practice reveals that unsound economic motivation still manages to682
win the day for most of the project developments (McGillivray 2012). A similar683
provision is present in the context of strictly protected species—Article 16 of the684
Habitats Directive—and is increasingly relied upon by Member States to justify685
unsustainable hunting practices aimed at increasing public tolerance for the presence686
of large carnivores.687
Third, the persisting lack of coherence and under-prioritization of the EU’s envi-688
ronmental policy in relation to other policy areas remains a focal point. The lack of689
a set of overarching rights of nature at EU level hinders the prevalence of ecological690
considerations within sectoral policies, such as agricultural policies. To give but one691
concrete illustration, a 2018 ruling of the CJEU highlighted the under-prioritization692
of nature conservation interests in the context of the CFP.55 Interpreting provisions693
regarding nature conservation that had been included in the 2013 Fisheries Regula-694
tion, the EU judges underscored that Member States are still precluded from adopting695
a ban on commercial fishing activities inside their own Natura 2000 sites when such696
measures affect fishing vessels of other Member States.697
Interim Conclusion698
The above analysis has unequivocally demonstrated that the operationalization of699
rights of nature within the current EU legal order would face substantial stumbling700
blocks. This gives rise to two distinctive preliminary conclusions: one, implementing701
rights of nature at the level of the EU constitutional treaties appears instrumental in702
repairing some of the persistent legal loopholes present within the existing EU legal703
framework regarding nature conservation; two, the operationalization of rights of704
nature at national level or through the adoption of secondary legislation (e.g. through705
54Case C-420/11 Leth (2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:166, para. 46.
55Case C-683/16 Deutscher Naturschutzring [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:433, para. 55–57.
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an EU directive) might not be able to overcome all the existing obstacles to ecological706
governance.707
Sparks of Hope: Promising Recent Jurisprudential708
Evolutions as New Pathways?709
Before addressing possible new avenues to bolster rights of nature within the existing710
EU legal order, I aim to briefly bring under the spotlight some recent jurisprudential711
evolutions which—at least indirectly—might reveal some unlocked potential for a712
rights of nature rationale within the existing pieces of EU environmental legislation.713
And while the analysis of cases is inevitably selective—it does not comprehensively714
address water management and public participation—it still points to an untapped715
reservoir of pieces of environmental legislation in terms of ecological governance.716
The Legal Teeth of the Precautionary Principle717
as a Progressive Starting Point718
In his seminal article, Stone correctly underlined that noting how ‘early’ irreparable719
damage to the environment might be occurring is often giving rise to many complex-720
ities, especially taking into account the multitude of uncertainties that come into721
play (Stone 1972). And while authors like Heyvaert have concluded that the role722
of the precautionary principle in the EU environmental policy is to be regarded as723
‘marginal’, a certain progressive shift is noticeable in recent jurisprudence. Refer-724
ence must certainly be made to the relatively progressive interpretation of Article725
6(3) of the Habitats Directive by the CJEU.56 When reasonable scientific doubt726
remains as to the absence of significant effects, no permit can be given pursuant to727
the well-known Wadden Sea rationale for plans and projects liable to cause damage728
to EU-protected sites. The relevance of the precautionary principle does not remain729
confined to the context of EU-protected nature, with the General Court relying upon730
the same principle when upholding an insecticides ban in 2018.57731
The practical importance of the precautionary principle for safeguarding the732
substantive rights of nature cannot be underlined enough. In the above-mentioned733
Bialowieza case, one of the strategies of the Polish government to justify its logging734
activities was to claim that such intrusive actions were needed in order to contain the735
outbreak of the spruce bark beetle, which was allegedly compromising the forest’s736
future. In their final ruling, however, the EU judges noted that there was still scientific737
controversy regarding the most appropriate methods to stop the spread of the spruce738
56Case C-127/02, Wadden Sea (2004) ECLI:EU:C:2004:482, para. 56–59.
57Case T-429/13 & T-541/13, Bayer CropScience AG (2018) ECLI:EU:T:2018:280, para. 109–111.
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bark beetle and thus dismissed the Polish arguments with reference to the precau-739
tionary principle.58 Most interestingly, though, the CJEU has recently also used the740
precautionary principle as an instrument to scrutinize recent biodiversity offsetting741
practices in the context of EU-protected nature. In a string of recent court cases, the742
EU judges were faced with project developments in which future habitat restora-743
tion measures were presented as genuine mitigation measures (Schoukens 2017).59744
The finding that the potential positive effects of the future creation of habitats are745
uncertain and highly difficult to forecast was cited here as the main rationale.60746
This jurisprudence is to be hailed as an implicit recognition of the intrinsic value of747
EU-protected nature.748
The Integrity of EU-Protected Nature Partly Preserved749
Along similar lines, the CJEU has also consistently treated EU-protected nature and750
species as ‘common heritage’. For instance, in its rulings regarding the destruc-751
tion of the Bialowieza forest, the CJEU explicitly underlined that the purported752
forestry practices would cause irreparable damage to the EU’s common heritage753
when reaching a substantive outcome.61 Likewise, when interpreting the notion of754
‘integrity of a Natura 2000 site’, the CJEU concluded that the integrity of a site is755
adversely affected if the project is liable to prevent the lasting preservation of the756
constitutive ecological characteristics of a site.62 This appears to be in line with757
Stone’s distinction between repairable damage to the environment—which might be758
balanced and weighed—and irreparable damage, which is to be precluded (Stone759
1972). Interestingly, the EU judges also held that even small-scale interventions760
could be deemed unacceptable since, when accumulated, they might stand in the761
way of the much-needed recovery of a Natura 2000 site.63 This is to be greeted as an762
important tool to combat the ‘risk of a death by a thousand cuts’. The outcome of the763
Weser case, where further clarification had to be given to the concept ‘deterioration764
of the ecological status of a waterbody’ when applying Article 4 of the Water Frame-765
work Directive at concrete permit level, is also instructive in this respect. Here, the766
EU judges stated that the latter concept implies the drop in quality status of at least767
one quality element, for instance, fish populations, even if that fall does not affect768
other quality elements of the affected waterbody.64 However, decisions, such as the769
58Case C-441/17, Commission v Poland (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:255, para. 179.
59Case C-164/17, Grace and Sweetman (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:593, para. 52–56; Cases C-387/26
and C-388/15, Orleans, ECLI:EU:C:2016:583, para. 50–56.
60Case C-521/12, Briels, ECLI:EU:C:2014:330, para. 32.
61Case C-441/17, Commission v Poland (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:255, para. 208.
62Case C-258/11, Sweetman (2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:220, para. 46.
63Ibid.
64Case C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland eV (2015) ECLI:EU:C:2015:433,
para. 66–67.
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Weser ruling, are often criticized in legal literature for their alleged normative vigour,770
since this jurisprudence seems to reject a so-called balancing approach (e.g. Salm771
2015). Such criticism further highlights the inherent difficulties of operationalizing a772
more eco-centric approach to nature within a primarily anthropocentric governance773
scheme.774
A Restoration Imperative, with Legal Teeth?775
Pursuant to Article 72 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, nature has the right to be776
restored, which constitutes but one illustration of the growing emphasis that is placed777
on the restoration narrative within the context of nature’s rights and beyond. However,778
at first glance, most of the seminal legal instruments in the EU’s environmental policy,779
such as the EU Nature Directives, do not seem to be explicitly preoccupied with780
putting forward ambitious restoration or enhancement plans. In a recent decision781
with respect to an attempt by the Dutch government to declassify a Natura 2000 site,782
though, the CJEU held that the restoration imperative which is present in Articles783
2 and 6 of the Habitats Directive also requires Member States to include degraded784
areas with ecological potential in the Natura 2000 Network.65785
A similar progressive attitude surfaced in a 2014 Italian case, where the CJEU786
repeated that Member States are principally tasked to prevent or, as the case may be,787
remedy further incremental degradation instead of simply abandoning an existing788
Natura 2000 site in exchange for the designation of other areas with similar char-789
acteristics.66 Another interesting example of the restoration imperative is offered by790
the outcome of the French Hamster case, where France was ultimately condemned791
by the CJEU for its failure to come forward with a robust recovery policy for its792
plummeting populations of wild hamsters.67793
Nature Trumps Vested Interests794
Operationalizing rights of nature inevitably requires a clear-cut mandate to interfere795
with unsustainable lock-in scenarios. The application of general principles of law,796
such as legal certainty, when combined with classic property law, could prevent797
national agencies and authorities from giving precedence to maintaining ecological798
integrity over short-term ecological interests. Even so, in a case concerning ongoing799
and authorized dredging works in a German protected site, the CJEU held that the800
principles of legitimate interests and legal certainty cannot be applied in such way that801
it would prevent new rules from being applicable to the future effects of previously802
65Case C-281/16, Vereniging Hoekschewaards Landschap (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:774.
66Case C-301/12, Cascina Tre Pini Ss (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:214, para. 32.
67Case C-241/08, Commission v France (2010) ECLI:EU:C:2010:114, para. 34–39.
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authorized activities, which turn the conservation duties included in Article 6(2) and803
(3) of the Habitats Directive, for instance, into very powerful tools for advocating a804
paradigm shift.68805
Most telling, though, was the 2016 decision of the CJEU in the Grüne Liga806
Sachsen case, where the CJEU was asked to shed light on the legal implications of807
the continuing adverse effects of an already constructed bridge. The CJEU clarified808
that ‘so far as concerns the economic cost of the steps that may be considered in809
the review of alternatives, including the demolition of the works already completed,810
(…) it must be stated (…) that that is not of equal importance to the objective811
of conserving natural habitats and wild fauna and flora pursued by the Habitats812
Directive. Therefore, account being taken of the strict interpretation of Article 6(4)813
of that directive, (…), it cannot be accepted that the economic cost of such measures814
alone may be a determining factor in the choice of alternative solutions under that815
provision’.69 The recent outcome of the Dutch case regarding the programmatic816
approach to nitrogen once again highlights the potency of the Habitats Directive, if817
rigorously applied, as an important lever to evolve towards more sustainable farming818
practices. In this respect, the CJEU reasoned that Member States cannot use generic819
conservation actions as a tool to mitigate additional nitrogen emissions linked to new820
project developments.70 And as a result, the Dutch government is now required to821
rethink its industrial farming industry in view of the adverse effects it creates for822
many degraded EU-protected sites.823
Interim Conclusion824
Authors like Bétaille claim that EU environmental law as it stands offers enough825
levers for a substantive improvement of the environmental quality within the EU. The826
case law addressed in this subsection seems to partly confirm this strand of argumenta-827
tion. Why do we need rights of nature when EU courts generally opt for a progressive828
interpretation of EU law? However, this approach only holds true when one negates829
the obvious difficulties to which a strict implementation of such progressive jurispru-830
dence is leading, especially within the current economic paradigms which are based831
upon the premise of infinite growth. For instance, in order to greatly reduce existing832
nitrogen deposition, a clear reduction of the dairy farming industry is required. Absent833
a legal translation of rights of nature in the constitutional framework of a legal order,834
well-trenched legal concepts such as property rights and legal certainty will be used835
as obstacles to prevent an effective implementation of the recent string of progressive836
rulings.837
68Case C-226/08, Stadt Papenburg (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2010:10, para. 49.
69Case C-399/14, Grüne Liga Sachsen eV (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:10, paras. 40–46.
70Case C-293/17, Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA, ECLI:EU:C:2018:882, para.
121–132.
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Avenues to the Future: A New Directive, Treaty Modification838
or National Legislation?839
Having now assessed the leeway for operationalizing rights of nature within the840
existing legal EU order, it has become clear that new legal or regulatory initiatives841
might be needed to push the EU towards a rights-based approach to nature in the842
short term. But what options remain to operationalize rights of nature in the short843
term within the EU legal order? This is assessed in the penultimate section of this844
chapter.845
A Rights of Nature Directive: A Tempting yet Unpersuasive846
Quick Legal Fix847
At first glance, one of the most obvious pathways to operationalize rights of nature848
is to adopt an EU directive on this very topic. It is therefore no surprise to see849
the charitable organization called ‘Nature’s Rights’ present a draft directive, which850
closely resembles the chapter on rights of nature that is included in the Ecuadorian’s851
Constitution. Generally speaking, the draft seems to address the majority of the852
deficiencies of the existing EU legal order against the backdrop of rights of nature.71853
According to Article 1, the proposed directive ‘provides for the substantive and854
procedural rights of nature, the rights of people in relation to nature, establishing a855
duty of care, protection and enforcement and ecological governance’. When conflicts856
arise between rights of nature and the rights of other physical or legal persons, a857
certain hierarchy needs to be observed. The maintenance of ‘the integrity, balance,858
health and equilibrium of nature as a whole’ is to prevail. No less groundbreaking859
is Article 4(5), which stipulates that ‘legal persons shall not enjoy any special rights860
or privileges that subordinates the rights of physical people and nature’. Likewise,861
the draft Directive also explicitly grants standing to nature, in terms that clearly go862
beyond anything that exists in existing EU environmental law. Breaches of the rights863
of nature are to give rise to compensation or restoration by the persons responsible for864
causing the breach. The proposed directive also obligates Member States to integrate865
and further protect nature’s rights though what is dubbed ‘ecological governance’866
aimed at restoring degraded landscapes.867
While the directive is certainly to be lauded as an interesting effort to opera-868
tionalize rights of nature within the EU legal order, it seems very unlikely that it will869
be adopted any time soon (Schoukens 2019). Yet even if adopted, I contend that this870
directive cannot be regarded as a meaningful step forward for rights of nature in the871
EU. In view of its grand ambition, though, the more fundamental point is whether872
the choice for the instrument of an EU directive is the right one. Implementing this873
71This proposal can be consulted at https://www.citizensforeurope.eu/organisation/rights-of-nature-
europe (accessed 15 September 2019).
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directive would entail the amendment and/or outright revoking of many existing874
environmental and other norms. At several points, the Directive openly goes against875
the hierarchy of norms present within the EU legal order: environmental directives876
are to be interpreted in view of the provisions of primary law, such as the TFEU, and877
not vice versa.878
Amending the EU Treaties: Balancing Between Theory879
and Pragmatism880
In view of the preceding analysis, I submit that the only sustainable manner to achieve881
an effective operationalization of rights of nature in the EU consists in an inclusion882
of certain rights in the EU constitutional treaties. As of today, however, the prospect883
of initiating a lengthy and complex treaty review for introducing rights of nature884
within the EU’s constitutional order seems to significantly downplay the success rate885
of this scenario. Even when encompassed in the context of a more general treaty886
revision, the question remains whether enough political support will be found for887
such amendments.888
National Legislation: The Ultimate Lever (?)889
A more hands-down way to implement rights of nature within the EU legal frame-890
work is to engage national parliaments and/or courts. For instance, in the Netherlands,891
several NGOs have already advocated the granting of legal personhood to the Wadden892
Sea, which has led to the adoption of a local ordinance advocating the establishment893
of an impartial management committee for the Wadden Sea.72 As such, conferring894
legal rights to ecosystems would not necessarily be hindered by the existing EU legal895
order. However, operationalizing rights of nature at municipality level will unavoid-896
ably lead to questions regarding the apparent (?) lack of competences of local author-897
ities in this particular domain. However, granting legal personhood might equally be898
done through the passing of national legislation. As environmental protection is a899
shared competence within the EU legal framework, sufficient leeway is offered to900
the Member States to consider the conferral of legal personhood to nature. More-901
over, such approach might also be in line with the subsidiarity principle, another902
fundamental principle of EU law. Pursuant to this principle, which is further defined903
in Article 5 TEU, the EU does not take action (except in the areas that fall within904
its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national,905
regional or local level. Of course, national legislation granting legal personhood to906
72See https://www.omropfryslan.nl/nieuws/895902-noardeast-fryslan-stemt-met-motie-voor-bij
zondere-rechten-waddengebied (accessed 15 September 2019).
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nature could still be challenged before national courts. When faced with new legis-907
lation passed for granting legal rights to nature, national courts could be tempted908
to refer legal questions relating to the alignment with EU law to the EU courts in909
Luxemburg in view of possible interferences with the EU legal order (Schoukens910
2019). However, this is not necessarily a bad thing: it might indeed offer the CJEU911
the ultimate opportunity to shed its view on the thorny legal questions to be faced912
when aligning rights of nature with primary EU law as well as EU nature conservation913
law.914
Conclusion and Outlook915
This chapter had no ambition to provide the reader with definitive answers to all ques-916
tions at stake regarding the interplay between rights of nature and the existing EU917
legal order. It merely wanted to initiate a conversation about a rights-based approach918
to nature by presenting a thorough analysis of how rights of nature might interact919
within a legal order which is still dominated by an anthropocentric approach to920
ecological governance. In the first section, I argued that introducing rights of nature921
in existing legal frameworks is to be approached as a crucial push to a more eco-922
centric and holistic approach to nature. Granted, the simple conferral of certain rights923
to nature itself will certainly not suffice to completely end all destruction of nature.924
However, by allowing nature to take a central place in our constitutional framework,925
also within the EU, a further impetus is given to a novel type of ecological gover-926
nance, which corrects the prevailing dichotomy between Man and Nature. The second927
section of this paper, which focused on the EU legal order, aptly demonstrated that928
the concrete operationalization of rights of nature within a primarily anthropocentric929
legal framework is liable to give rise to a multitude of legal issues. In this respect,930
this chapter’s main conclusion is that the emerging case law of the CJEU, especially931
in the field of precaution, EIA, water management and habitat restoration might offer932
new, more gradual pathways towards ecological governance. Conversely, the doors933
of the EU courts remain firmly closed for nature in the context of direct standing934
before the EU courts. Likewise, EU environmental law lacks a clear ‘ecological935
integrity’ imperative in order to mitigate and/or correct its anthropocentric under-936
pinnings. Whereas implementing rights of nature through the adoption of an EU937
directive sounds tempting it would inevitably give rise to countless legal objections938
and questions. As a treaty reform appears unrealistic for the time being, a more939
realistic short-term option would consist in implementing rights of nature through940
national legislation, which might ultimately present itself as the more appropriate941
bottom-up solution in this context. AQ2942
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